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Abstract
Local and regional policy makers are acquiring an increasingly active role in a¤ecting rms
specialization decisions that in turn inuence rmsvertical organization. We analyse the relation
between vertical integration incentives and trade liberalization in the presence of glocal policies,
i.e., specic (local) policies that have international (global) impact.
More precisely, one of the most important reasons for vertical integration in the presence of
sunk costs of specialization is avoiding the risk of hold up. We introduce the idea that this sunk
cost can be manipulated by the policy maker at national/regional/local level. We characterize
the conditions under which policies are e¤ective in achieving a particular equilibrium in terms
of vertical structure and specialization decision. The main result is that the policy e¤ectiveness
is stronger the higher is the importance of the hold-up problem. In particular, we investigate
how glocal policies interact with policies that a¤ect the market openness (trade policy). We nd
that for high values of the specialization upgrade cost, trade policies are ine¤ective. At the same
time, if the trading cost is very low, glocal policies are ine¤ective. Finally, in the presence of
intermediate specialization upgrade and trading cost, either policy supplements the other policy.
JEL classication: D23, F15, F23, H54, L22.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature studying the role of trade liberalization on industry vertical structure.
The main mechanism being the e¤ect of international openness on opportunism problems generated
by hold-up. The pioneering contribution is McLaren (2000). He shows that openness a¤ects rms
decision to produce either a specialized or exible input and in turn whether to vertically integrate,
by mitigating the unbalanced bargaining power. More precisely, the production of a specialized input
requires sunk cost that gives to the buyer a kind of monopsony power. In particular, in the absence
of alternative buyers, the risk for the input producer of not recouping its cost ex post generates hold
up. In McLaren trade liberalization mitigates this problem by rising the market thickness, that is
increasing the number of alternative buyers (i.e. the foreign rms).
We argue that in the framework of vertical integration decisions and trade liberalization a new
actor is acquiring an increasingly active role: local and regional policy makers. More precisely, we
analyse the relation between vertical integration incentives and trade liberalization in the presence of
glocal policies, i.e., specic local policies that have global impact. Namely, we refer to the neologism
"glocalization" described in the Think Tank on Glocalization held in Rome (May 2003) that aims to
integrate the strong powers of global governance and the strenght of the local dimension. In line with
their approach, we want to emphasize the fact that the global e¤ect of a policy is more likely to succeed
when this policy is adapted specically to each locality or culture and to "establish a link between
the benets of the global dimension and the local realities, while at the same time, establishing a
bottom up system for the governance of globalization" (Glocal Forum 2003, p. 13-14).1 We focus on
glocal policies that a¤ect rmsvertical organization by mitigating the hold-up problem. A recent
example can be found in Emilia-Romagna (Italy). On March 4, 2013 the University of Bologna
jointly with Unindustria Bologna created AlmaCube Limited Company.2 This is an innovative way
to prompt the creation of start-up. Indeed, for the rst time in Italy, institutional sponsors not
only give nancial, administrative and scal facilities to new start-up but become partners by taking
a relevant part of the entrepreneurial risk. In this way the sunk cost of producing an innovative
and specialized input is shared between the private and public partners. Consequently the risk of
hold-up for the private entrepreneur is mitigated. At European level we can nd other examples in
the Horizon 2020 program,3 like the initiatives devoted to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), in
particular "providing support to help single SMEs, or consortia of SMEs, assess the market viability
of their ideas at the high-risk stage, and then to help them develop these ideas further."4 Further
1The relevance of these policies is analysed by several scholars. Martins and Rodrigiez Alvarez (2007) emphasize
the growning role of local leaders in a global context; Iammarino and Santangelo (2000) analyse the attractiveness of
the Italian regions for FDI; Isaksen and Onsager (2010) study the knowledge-intensive industries in Norway and nd
that the small urban regions and the rural regions have a higher share of innovating, knowledge-intensive rms than
the large urban regions, which may partly be explained by a much higher rate of public funding of innovation activity
in the rst two regional types.
2See http://www.almacube.com.
3Further examples are in Section 5.
4See http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/sites/horizon2020/les/H2020_inBrief_EN_FinalBAT.pdf,
page 10.
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motivation for our analysis comes from the increasing demand for such specic policies. An example
is provided by Ducati and Lamborghinis recent proposal for Emilia Romagna high school students
to do a two years internship. In September 2014 these two Volkswagen groups rms have signed a
joint agreement with the Unions, the local Institutions and the Ministry of Education.5 Our aim is
to investigate the e¤ect of the interaction between these policies and international openness on rms
vertical organization.
The main ingredients of our model are the following ones. We consider a competitive market with
a number of output and input producers. Each nal output needs an essential input produced by
an upstream rm. An input can be either (fully) specialized for a specic nal good or exible that
is suitable for any nal good production. The specialized input confers a higher value to the output
for which it has been designed than the exible input but it implies higher sunk costs of production
and in turn higher risk for the input producer to be held-up. In the literature, di¤erent degrees of
specialization have been introduced. For instance, while McLaren (2000) focuses on the extreme case
of full specialization, Grossman and Helpman (2002) introduce the idea that specialization typically
occurs in stages so that for each nal good there is an ideal component, but nal producers can use less
specialized components at additional costs. In line with this literature, we consider di¤erent degrees
of specialization that imply di¤erent degrees of hold-up (i.e. probability to recoup the sunk cost of
input production). Namely, in the full specialization case, the input is perfectly suitable for only one
nal good, in other words the input is so specialized that only one downstream rm can use it (one
upstream rm for one downstream rm); lower degrees of specialization mean that the features of the
input are such that it can be adapted to at least two nal goods (one upstream rm for more than one
downstream rm). Intuitively, given the dynamic path of the technologies, it may well happen that,
at a certain point of this path, two downstream rms use the same specialized input (for instance
they could have invested in the same basic research, as a joint venture or as sponsors and beneciaries
of the same public research institute). In the latter case, even though our less specialized input could
somewhat resemble a exible input, this is not the case: this input is always specialized given that
it could be adapted only to a subset of rms. Our denition of specialization recall the exible
manufacturing systems studied by Norman and Thisse (1999). In particular, exible manufacturing
systems (FMS) are dened as "a production unit capable of producing a range of discrete products
with a minimum of manual intervention". As they state: "The essence of FMS is that it allows rms
to customize their products to the requirements of heterogeneous consumers at little or no cost".6
5A similar example is the Bosh pilot working students project in Puglia, for details see for instance the Italian link
http://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/homepage/ministro-giannini-a-bosch-modugno-no784230.
6Norman and Thisse (1999) point out several examples like Hitachi and Mitsubishi in the production of elevators
and heavy construction equipment or the Italian ceramic tile manufacturer Marazzi.
Furthermore, in the aircraft industry, the jet (turboprop) engine and the jet (turboprop) aircraft industries are
vertically related. To produce a di¤erentiated product, aircraft rms have to procure suitable equipment. Bonaccorsi
and Giuri (2001) point out that in the presence of economies of scope, engine programs are potentially applicable
to di¤erent aircraft programs of di¤erent manufactures. This allows engine companies to relate to many buyers, and
potentially to all of them. Furthermore, in the automobile industry, Toyota procures electric parts from Denso, which
is one of the largest auto-part manufactures. Denso sometimes supplies to other automobile manufacturers, for instance,
Daimler Chrysler. Thus, electric parts may be used in automobiles of di¤erent manufactures (Ahmadjian and Lincoln,
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More precisely, we assume that di¤erent degrees of specialization imply di¤erent sunk costs
and we introduce the idea that the sunk cost can be manipulated by the policy maker (at na-
tional/regional/local level). We show that the equilibria, in terms of vertical structure and spe-
cialization decision, depend on the specialization costs (generated by the sunk cost), the integration
costs and the trade costs (generated by the international openness): the manipulation of the special-
ization cost reects mainly the glocal policies, whereas the manipulation of the integration and trade
costs reect policies at national and international level.
Our main results are as follows. We conrm the results gathered in the literature about the hold
up motive for vertical integration, the importance of the outside options for the risk of being held-up
and in turn the importance of the markets characteristics (like international openness and asymmetry
between buyers and sellers that a¤ect the thickness of the market). Our new results focus on the
e¤ects of the interaction between policies at local, regional, national and international level. Namely,
in the closed economy (low international openness), the degree of specialization of the inputs and the
cost of this specialization are crucial in order to implement policies that inuence the rms/clusters
decisions. A higher specialization upgrade cost implies a higher sunk cost and in turn a higher
risk of being held up (and vice versa). The manipulation of the specialization upgrade cost is thus
e¤ective in inuencing rmsvertical structure as long as the inputs are su¢ ciently specialized. This
scenario changes when the trade costs decrease (higher international openness): here, the presence
of highly specialized inputs becomes less and less crucial to ensure the e¤ectiveness of manipulating
the specialization upgrade costs. Finally, in the absence of trade costs a policy maker is not able
anymore to inuence the vertical structure of the rms/clusters through such glocal policies. In other
terms, manipulating the specialization upgrade cost is always e¤ective (both in the closed and in the
open economy) in a¤ecting rmsspecialization decision (specialized versus exible input). However,
this policy inuences rmsvertical structure only as long as the inputs are highly specialized and
the trade barriers are su¢ ciently high. Indeed, when the inputs are not very specialized as well as
the trade barriers are low, the hold-up risk is not signicant (as for rms there will always be some
alternative buyer, in other words the market is su¢ ciently thick).
Related literature. Our paper is related to the literature that analyses how rms boundary
choices are a¤ected by market conditions. The theoretical contributions show that the relationship
between trade liberalization and industry vertical structure is ambiguous. Our analysis is based on
McLaren (2000)s model, that is a simple still exhaustive framework where the relationship between
internationalization and hold-up is clearly dened and we extend this model in several ways. McLaren
(2000) focuses on the role of input market thickness that is a result of globalization. In McLarens
words a rise in market thickness can be dened "as any increase in the e¤ective number of rms in
a given market, in the sense that there is an increase in the probability that any given agent will be
able to nd in a given length of time an agent with whom it will be possible to realize gains from
trade" (McLaren 2003, p-328). He argues three (new) consequences of the vertical integration decision
2001).
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related to globalization: rst, each upstream rm is more likely to nd an alternative interested buyer,
the more unintegrated rms there are (as the weaker the hold-up problem will be). This is a strategic-
complements property. Second, opening the economy will make it easier for an input supplier to nd
an attractive alternative buyer abroad. In this sense, international trade can decrease the incentive
to vertical integration. Third, openness gives each rm more options in its procurement strategy,
and so it is unambiguously e¢ ciency enhancing. McLaren (2000) nds an exact correspondence
between ownership structure and technology choice. Moreover, multiple equilibria arise: there is
always one equilibrium where all rms are vertically integrated, but if there is a su¢ ciently high
number of rms in the market (as in case of international openness) there is a second equilibrium
where all rms are vertically separated. This latter equilibrium is more e¢ cient because it allows
to save "the governance costs of running a more complex organization". We depart from McLaren
(2000) in what we introduce asymmetry between upstream and downstream rms, di¤erent degrees
of specialization as well as the possibility for the policy maker to a¤ect the specialization cost and
in turn rmsvertical organization. The presence of this asymmetry and intermediate degrees of
specialization alleviates the hold-up problem and in turn it reduces the market thickness e¤ects
related to opening the market on rmsorganization. We thus have equilibria in which rms with
di¤erent vertical organizations coexist and there may not be a perfect correspondence between rms
vertical structure and specialization decision. The policy implication is that it is always possible to
a¤ect rmsspecialization decision, however as the market becomes thicker it may not be possible to
inuence rmsvertical structure.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) develop a more complex framework and study the determinants of
the rmsequilibrium vertical organization when inputs are fully or partially specialized.7 Similarly
to McLaren, they nd that as the number of rms on each side of the market grows, there can be
two stable equilibria: one with vertical integration and the other with outsourcing. Outsourcing is
more likely to be viable in large industries / economies because of the advantage of a thicker market.8
So that, in line with McLaren, they nd that an industry is unlikely to be populated by rms with
di¤erent organizational forms basically because they assume that all potential entrants are of the
same type.
In the previous contributions, as in our model, competition e¤ects are absent. In contrast, Wes
(2000) develops a bilateral monopoly model and point out a pro-competitive e¤ect in the output
market associated with international trade that also alleviates the hold-up problem and thus discour-
ages mergers. Namely, an upstream producer, prior to production, has to make a transaction-specic
investment, characterized by increasing returns, to trade with the downstream rm. Wes shows that
under autarky there is a holdup problem and the upstream rm underinvests.9 International trade
between two (identical) countries implies both allocative and productive e¢ ciency gains. Indeed,
7They consider a general equilibrium model thus accounting for the mechanisms by which a rms choices a¤ect
market conditions, that in turn a¤ect other rmsorganization decisions.
8However in Grossman and Helpman (2002) the reason for this result is the presence of increasing returns to search,
whereas in McLaren "market thickness acts as a brake on opportunism", McLaren (2003), p. 331.
9 In our model the under-investment is captured by the decision to produce a exible input.
5
in the open economy the industrial structure changes from a monopoly to a duopoly so that the
price charged by the downstream rm in each country decreases; this increase in product demand in
turn raises productive e¢ ciency because it motivates the upstream rms to invest more, given their
increasing returns technologies.
Ornelas and Turner (2008) develop a theoretical partial equilibrium model and argue that trade
liberalization increases the incentives of foreign suppliers to undertake cost-reducing investments and,
in contrast with the previous papers, it may prompt vertical multinational integration. The reason is
that in Ornelas and Turners model the foreign supplier is fully specialized to the home buyers needs,
so its outside option is una¤ected by trade liberalization. This e¤ectively shuts down all market-
thickening forces. Also, expected trade volumes are larger when rms are integrated, accordingly the
direct cost of a tari¤ is higher when the rms are vertically integrated than when they operate under
the arms length arrangement. Then, lower trade costs do not necessarily lead to more outsourcing
versus vertical integration. Their results relate to the literature on whether trade and FDI are
substitutes or complements. On one hand, lower tari¤s reduce incentives for vertical integration by
mitigating the hold-up problem, implying substitutability. On the other hand, lower tari¤s make
integration more attractive because of the trade volume e¤ect, implying complementarity.10
Conconi et al. (2012) examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets a¤ects rms
integration decisions via the induced changes in (output and input) prices. They develop a perfectly-
competitive, specic-factor model of trade and focus on the trade-o¤ between the managerial quiet
life(pushing towards the non-integration decision) and the coordination of the production activities
(pushing towards integration). They show that, even when rms do not relocate across countries,
the price changes triggered by the increase in factor mobility can change the ownership structures
within countries.11 Similarly, we show that even if input trade does not take place at equilibrium,
the price changes triggered by the international openness a¤ect rmsvertical organization.
As for the empirical contributions, there is a vast literature that examines the determinants of
rmsvertical integration decisions.
Chongvilaivan and Hur (2012) investigate the e¤ects of trade openness on the pattern of vertical
integration using U.S. manufacturing industry data from 2002 to 2006. Their empirical results reveal
10Antras (2003) addresses the question of why intra-rm trade is positively correlated with capital-labor ratios across
U.S. industries and capital-labor ratios across countries from which the U.S. imports. He develops a property rights
model of the boundaries of the rm, in which, in equilibrium transaction costs of using the market are increasing in
the capital intensity of the imported good. The attractiveness of vertical integration is shown to be increasing in the
capital intensity of intermediate goods production. The argument is based on the idea that investments related to labor
input are harder to share than investments in physical capital.
11Alfaro et al. (2014) focus on the e¤ect of prices on vertical integration decisions. They test the theoretical statement
that integration, while costly, increases productivity, thus higher prices induce more integration (the idea is that at
low prices, increases in revenues coming from enhaunced productivity are too small to justify the cost; whereas at high
prices the revenue benet exceeds the integration cost). Trade policy provides a source of exogenous price variation to
asses the validity of this theoretical prediction. They construct rm level indices of vertical integration for a large set
of countries and industries and exploit cross-section and time-series variation in import tari¤s to examine their impact
on rm boundaries. They focus on competitive sectors in order to rule out alternative mechanism that could generate
a positive relation between tari¤s and vertical integration. They conclude that output prices are a key determinant of
vertical integration.
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a negative relationship between international openness and a motive for vertical integration thus
supporting the theoretical statement by McLaren (2000).12
On top of the e¤ects of international trade, some empirical contributions analyse the role of
contract enforcement on rmsvertical structure. Pascali (2013) develops a model with incomplete
contracts studying the interactions among trade barriers, contracting costs, technology intensity, and
the extent of vertical integration. He also investigates these predictions through a cross-country
analysis at rm level. The main empirical ndings, consistent with theory, are that the likelihood
to integrate vertically is decreasing in the quality of domestic contracting institutions and in in-
ternational openness. The emerging policy advice in order to reduce the welfare costs associated
with vertical integration is that "if improving home institutions is not feasible, then an equivalent
solution is to reduce the trade barriers to the import of intermediates." Somewhat similarly, we nd
some substitutability between glocal policies and international openness in a¤ecting the incentives
to vertically integrate. Other cross-country empirical contributions on the e¤ects of the institutional
environment on the vertical boundaries of rms are Macchiavello (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2009).
These studies are at industry-level and analyse the role of nancial development.13
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. We proceed with
the equilibrium analysis in the closed and in the open economy in Sections (3) and (4) respectively.
We discuss our results in terms of e¤ective policies in Section (5). Formal details, denitions, proofs
and gures are relegated in the Appendix.
12Recently, Atalay et al. (2014) study the relationship between vertical integration and input ows using microdata
from two sources, the US Economic Census and the Commodity Flow Survey, and aggregate data from the Annual
Wholesale Trade Survey and the Annual Retail Trade Survey. Departing from previous literature, they nd that
"most vertical ownership does not appear to be primarily concerned with facilitating physical goods movements along
a production chain within the rm, as is commonly presumed. Upstream units ship surprisingly small shares of their
output to their rmsdownstream establishments." Rather, their results suggest that "a primary purpose of ownership
may be to mediate e¢ cient transfers of intangible inputs within rms".
13Other contributions focus on institutions quality and trade ows. In particular, Nunn (2007), using a multi-country
dataset at industry level, tests whether the intensity of contract enforcement is a source of comparative advantage.
Another important contribution is Levchenko (2007) showing that countries with better institutions specialize in goods
that are institutionally dependent.
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2 The model
We consider a two-country model. In each country there is an industry with N upstream (U) rms
and N + H downstream (D) rms. Each D (U) can use (produce) only one unit of input. They
can decide to vertically integrate. The D rms produce di¤erentiated nal goods. Each nal output
needs an essential input produced by an U rm. An input can be either specialized (S) or exible
(F ). To produce (one unit of) input S, the U rm incurs a sunk cost equal to KS , whereas to produce
(one unit of) input F , the U rm incurs a sunk cost KF = KS (1  ) < KS with  2 (0; 1) such
that the cost gap is K = KS  KF = KS .14 Note that this gap depends on  which may capture
a local/regional/national policy attempting to a¤ect the cost of specialization. Think for example
of investments in tertiary technological education, investments to stimulate IT start-up, and other
input specic investments.
Firm Dj (with j = 1; :::; N) prot depends on the characteristics of the input received by rm
U . If input j is fully specialized for output j it has a high value for Dj (equal to Rjj) but it has no
value for D j (equal to Rj j = 0). Whereas if input j is exible it has value for both Dj (equal to
ejj) and D j (equal to ej j), however it is more valuable for output j than for  j (0 < ej j < ejj).
Formally, we have the following ranking:15
Rjj = 1 > ejj > ej j > Rj j = 0:
As for rm DN+h (with h = 1; :::;H), we assume that with some probability  2 [0; 1] there exists a
specialized input for rm DN+h, in other words, rm, say, Uk (with k = N H+1; :::; N) can produce
a specialized input for bothDk andDN+h with k 6= N+h. We thus consider N upstream rms among
which H rms are dened as "special" because with probability  they have an extra counterpart.16
This assumption reects the idea that there exist di¤erent degrees of specialization. Namely,  = 0
represents the full specialization case that is the input produced by rm Uk is perfectly suitable
for only the nal good produced by Dk, so that rm DN+h has not a corresponding potentially
specialized input and then it can only buy from Uj and get value at most equal to ejN+h.17 As 
increases, the input becomes less specialized. When we arrive at  = 1, it means that the features of
the input are such that it can be adapted to at least two nal goods, i.e. Uk has an extra counterpart
with certainty. In the latter case, even though our less specialized input could somewhat resemble a
exible input, this is not the case: this input is always specialized given that it could be adapted only
to a subset of rms.18 Intuitively, given the dynamic path of the technologies, it may well happen
that, in a certain point of this path, two rms (say Dk and DN+h) use the same specialized input
14More precisely, we denote this cost gap as specialization upgrade cost, see the Glossary in Appendix.
15We can think of producing a software specialized for a Nokia mobile phone, that has no value for a Samsung versus
a exible software thought for a Nokia but adaptable for a Samsung or other mobile phones.
16We can think of the "special" rms as rms that are abler than the others to capture the potential externalities
(spillovers) of their investments in specialized inputs.
17Note that the rst N  H upstream rms may either produce a exible or a fully specialized input ( = 0).
18We maintain the term "specialized" because di¤erently from a exible input that has a positive value for all D
rms, this specialized input is valuable only for Dk and DN+h.
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(for instance they could have invested in the same basic research, as a joint venture or as sponsors
and beneciaries of the same public research institute). The more we are far from this common point
the lower is .19
Summarizing, HN is the share of U rms that has a potential extra counterpart. Among this
share, HN e¤ectively behaves as special and (1  ) HN e¤ectively behaves as the remaining share of
upstream rms in the market that is N HN .
20 For the sake of description we label k the representa-
tive rm belonging to the subset H of special rms and i the representative rm belonging to the
complementary subset N  H.
Note that the asymmetric number of U and D rms implies that there are H downstream rms
that remain without a U partner and so they do not produce at equilibrium. Consequently, there are
N couples that can match perfectly. While most of the theoretical contributions consider symmetric
frameworks, we assume this asymmetry that we nd more consistent with the real world. We can
think of the non-matching rms as potential entrants that are not active ex post.
Consider the input production decision of Uj (with j = 1; :::; N). Under vertical separation (VS),
the payo¤ of producing a specialized input is  KS + PjS , where PjS is the price of the specialized
input; the payo¤ of producing a exible input is  KF + PjF , where PjF is the price of the exible
input. Under vertical integration (VI) there are further internal "governance" costs equal to L and
the merger payo¤ of producing a specialized input is  L KS +Rjj > 0 whereas the merger payo¤
of producing a exible input is  L KF + 0 < 0.21
The sequence of events is as follows (Figure 1):
i  is generated by the local/regional/national/international policies (policies).
ii Each couple of rms Uj and Dj jointly decide whether to vertically integrate (merger stage).
iii The sunk input production cost is incurred and so the value of each input j produced by Uj is
revealed (production stage).
iv Bids are placed for inputs and exchange occurs (market stage).
We solve the model by backward induction, considering in turn the closed and the open economy.
In particular we solve backwards the market stage, the production stage and the merger stage and
as a result we nd the equilibrium vertical structures and specialization decisions as a function of
. As for the policies, note that this is not a proper stage of the game. Namely, according to the
19Di¤erent countries may clearly have di¤erent values of  according to di¤erent institutional and private investments
in basic versus specilized research, di¤erent protection of intellectual property private policies (patent versus secret),
di¤erent matching opportunities.
20Formally, the number of special rms is a random variable described by a binomial distribution B (H;). Thus,
the expected number of special rms is H.
21Note that we do not consider any marginal cost of production. This allows us to neglect any vertical foreclosure
motive linked to the vertical integration decisions. This is in line with Legros and Newman (2014) that point out
how organizational features of the rms (e.g., vertical integration, delegation) are becoming more and more important
factors in empirical and theoretical IO, in many cases more important than competitive pressure.
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di¤erent scenarios identied in the equilibrium analysis, we investigate the circumstances in which the
policy maker can reach a specic objective in terms of rmsvertical structure and/or specialization
decision.22
Figure 1: The sequence of events.
22We postpone to Section 5 a detailed discussion about the policy objective.
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3 Equilibrium analysis in the closed economy
We rst focus on the closed economy version of the model. For each stage of the game, we analyse
the choice of each special rm k and the choice of each rm i in turn.
3.1 The market stage
Consider the market stage. In the Appendix (7.2) we provide a detailed explanation for the price
setting. In the following, we present the subgames and the corresponding equilibrium prices.
1 Vertical separation, exible input: VS (F). The equilibrium bid byDi to rm Ui is PiF = eij > 0.
The equilibrium bid by Dk to rm Uk is PkF = ekk + (1  ) ekj .
2 Vertical separation, specialized input: VS (S). The equilibrium bid by Di to Ui is PiS = 0. The
equilibrium bid by Dk to Uk is PkS = Rkk.
Clearly, whenever rms decide to merge (subgame 3, VI (F) and subgame 4, VI (S)), there is no
market price setting because the input is tranferred at its marginal cost.
Typically, the risk of hold up leads the rm to produce a exible input rather than a specialized
input under vertical separation. Indeed for rm i, under vertical separation the equilibrium price of a
specialized input is zero. Note however that the asymmetric structure of the industry (in particular
the presence of N + H downstream rms and   0) implies that the hold up problem is not
necessarily complete for the special rms as PkS  0. More precisely, in our model the hold-up
problem is mitigated with respect to McLaren (2000) as while in McLaren the hold up could be
complete also for exible inputs, that is PiF = 0,23 here the equilibrium input price PiF is strictly
positive.
3.2 Production stage
In the production stage the U rms take the exible/specialized decisions.
Dene
F  KS + ekj
Rkk   ekk + ekj (1)
and
  Rjj   ejj : (2)
 represents the gross specialization upgrade gain: throughout the paper we will focus on the non-
trivial case  > L, that is the gain of specialization covers at least the cost of integration. Comparing
subgames 1 and 2, and subgames 3 and 4, we obtain the following Lemma.
23More precisely, McLaren obtains incomplete hold-up by assuming the presence of a dude PjF > 0 only if there is
at least one e¤ective input (Proposition 4).
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Lemma 1 (i) Under VS each Ui chooses to produce a exible input; whereas each Uk chooses to
produce a exible input if  < F and chooses to produce a specialized input if  > F .
(ii) Under VI, the optimal choice is to produce a specialized input if KS < , whereas it is
optimal to produce a exible input if KS > .
Proof. See Appendix (7.3).
3.3 Merger stage
Consider next the merger stage, that is when VI or VS occurs.
Denition 1 VI takes place if and only if the prot of the VI entity is higher than the sum of the
prots of the two vertically separated rms.
According to this denition, we can now solve the merger stage.
Lemma 2 (i) Firms Uk and Dk choose VI with a specialized input if  < F [ KS <    L; in
all other cases VS occurs. In case of VS, the production/use of a exible input occurs if KS > 
and if KS 2 (  L;) [  < F , otherwise specialization occurs.
(ii) Firms Ui and Di choose VI with a specialized input if KS <    L and VS with a exible
input if KS >   L.
Proof. See Appendix (7.4).
These conditions emphasize the potential role of institutions () in driving the integration and
in turn the specialization decisions.24
3.4 Equilibrium
Solving for the VI and VS decisions of rms we obtain the following equilibria according to the
specialization upgrade cost KS .
Proposition 1 (i) Consider the case KS <    L. At equilibrium, VI with a specialized input
occurs for all rms if  < F . If instead  > F , we observe di¤erent behaviors: VS with specialized
input for each rm k and VI with a specialized input for each rm i.
(ii) Consider the case KS 2 (  L;). At equilibrium, VS with a exible input occurs for all
rms if  < F . If instead  > F , we observe di¤erent behaviors: VS with a specialized input for
each rm k and VS with a exible input for each rm i.
(iii) Consider nally the case KS > . At equilibrium, VS with a exible input occurs for all
rms.
Proof. See Appendix (7.5).
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Figure 2: Closed Economy Equilibrium
Figure 2 displays rmsequilibrium behaviors in the closed economy. As far as the equilibrium
behaviors of the rms i are concerned (Figure 2a), the relevant threshold is KS =    L =
Rii   eii   L. Starting from the idea that going from a exible to a specialized input implies an
upgrade, an improvement of the quality of the input, we dene KS the specialization upgrade cost.
Similarly, we dene    L the net specialization upgrade gain, that is the hold-up free gain (given
that integration guarantees full insurance against the risk of hold-up). It is then intuitive that as
long as KS >    L, that is the upgrade cost is not covered by the net upgrade gain, integration
is not protable.
As for the special rms, looking at Figure 2b, the most important di¤erence with respect to the
other rms is that for some values of the parameters, vertical integration is not necessary anymore
in order to have specialization; in other words, at equilibrium the special rms can choose VS (S).
This is due to the attenuated hold-up. More precisely, we get a further relevant threshold, F (KS),
increasing with KS .25
Rephrasing our equilibrium results according to the probability of being special , we conclude
the following.
24For example, several studies analyse the role of Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) as an important component
of a smart specialization strategy implemented by regions. In particular, OECD (2011) and COM (2011) argue that
many future goods and services will be driven by KETs such as semiconductors, advanced materials, photonics and
nanotechnology.
25 In Appendix, we provide a more detailed description of Figure 2b.
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Corollary 2 In the closed economy, (i) if  2 0; F , there is perfect correspondence between the
rm vertical structure and the input specialization decision: at equilibrium all rms behave in the
same way.
(ii) If  2 F ; 1, there is not anymore a perfect correspondence between the rm vertical struc-
ture and the input specialization decision: at equilibrium, rms behave in di¤erent ways.
For low values of  ( 2 0; F ) at equilibrium all rms behave in the same way, they either
stay VS with F or VI with S. This result is in line with McLaren (p. 1246): "there is an exact
correspondence between ownership structure and technology choice". Note that when  is low ( <
F ), it is as if any Uk were identical to any rm Ui. Given F =
KS+ekj
 ekj , this is more likely, the
lower is  and the higher is KS . For high values of  ( 2

F ; 1

) at equilibrium, rms behave in
di¤erent ways. If VI occurs, independently of , the VI rms choose to produce a specialized input;
if VS occurs, rm Ui always chooses a exible input, whereas Uk chooses either a specialized or a
exible input depending on the parameters.
14
4 Equilibrium analysis in the open economy
The open economy is described as follows. There are two countries: 1 and 2. In order to focus
on the vertical structure / input specialization decision, we assume that only inputs can be traded,
that is the nal goods are nontraded (for instance because nal goods of country 2 are unattractive
to consumers of country 1 or because of too high trade costs related (only) to nal goods).26 We
assume that countries are perfectly symmetric. Consequently, when we open the economy each U1j
can sell her input to D1j , D
1
 j and incurring a trade cost t to D
2
j and D
2
 j . The superscript refers
to the country f1; 2g and the lowerscript refers to the rm fj; jg. Formally, each U rm becomes
"special" in the sense that it can produce an input that is specialized for at least two D rms (one
per country). The immediate consequence of opening the (input) market is thus a change in the
bargaining power between the rms. The bargaining power of the U producers increases and that of
the D rms decreases. Each U1j can vertically integrate with D
1
j (D
2
j ) incurring xed cost L
1 (L2).27
It is worth emphasizing that opening the market implies a rise in market thickness that however is
distinct from an increase in competition. In our paper, in line with McLaren (2000) as well as with
many of the contributions on this area, competition e¤ects are absent (see McLaren 2003).28
4.1 The market stage
Consider the market stage. Dening
"  eii   eij (3)
as the tting gain for a exible input, we can write Rii   eij =  + ". In the Appendix (7.2) we
provide a detailed explanation for the price setting. In the following, we present the subgames and
the corresponding equilibrium prices.
1 Vertical separation, exible input: VS (F). The equilibrium price received by rm Ui depends
on the level of trade cost t:
P iF =

eij if t > "
eii   t else :
The equilibrium price for a special rm Uk is:
P kF =

ekk + (1  ) ekj if t > " (1  )
ekk   t else :
2 Vertical separation, specialized input: VS (S). The equilibrium price for a rm i is P iS = Rii t.
Whereas the equilibrium price for a special rm Uk is:
P kS =

Rkk if t > Rkk (1  )
Rkk   t else :
26We acknowledge that this is a simplifying assumption. However it is line with previous contributions, like McLaren
(2000) whose theoretical model have been empirically substantiated, see for instance Chongvilaivan and Hur (2012).
27Note that the ranking between L1 and L2 can be either L1 > L2 or L1  L2 because of country-specic cost to
create a rm.
28For a focus on the pro-competitive e¤ects of international trade in the presence of the hold-up problem see, among
others, Wes (2000) that focuses on the free trade of the downstream good.
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In subgames 3, VI (F) and 4, VI (S), there is no market price setting because the input is
tranferred at its marginal cost.
Figure 3: Market Stage
Figure 3 displays the market stage equilibrium prices as a function of : the left panel shows the
closed economy case and the right panel shows the open economy case. Looking at this gure, we can
compare the hold-up problem (reected in the prices) faced by rms when dealing with a specialized
input versus a exible input.
Consider rst the decision of producing a specialized input (top of Figure 3). All rms gain from
opening the market in terms of holdup: namely, for any value of , the hold up for the i rms,
that is maximal in the closed economy, decreases (PiS = 0 < P iS), and the hold-up for the special
rms is at most equal (PkS < P kS for  < 1  tRkk and PkS = P kS for  > 1 
t
Rkk
). More precisely,
the special rm strictly prefers the open economy with respect to the closed economy as long as 
is low, and it is indi¤erent when  is high. The intuition is that for low values of , the k rms are
"not very special", that is they are very similar to the i rms. In particular, in the closed economy
the special rms are subject to a lower hold-up than the other rms, for any  > 0; whereas, in the
open economy, for  low enough, the market stage equilibrium prices are equal for all rms, and for
 high enough the k rms get a higher price than the i ones. Note however that this price di¤erence
is lower than in the closed economy.
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Consider next the decision of producing a exible input (bottom of Figure 3). Firmspreferences
depend on the trade costs, t. First, as long as t > ", nothing changes when moving from the closed
to the open economy (the threshold  = 1   t" < 0). If instead t < ", all rms gain from opening
the market: namely, for any value of , the hold up for the i rms decreases (PiF < P iF ), and the
hold-up for the k rms is at most equal (PkF < P kF for  < 1   t" and PkF = P kF for  > 1   t").
Again, the i rms strictly prefer to open the market, whereas the k rms have a strict preference for
 low and they are indi¤erent between the closed and the open economy for  high.29
In sum we can say that in the closed economy the k rms are always better o¤ than the i rms,
whereas this relative advantage becomes nil in the open economy, i.e., for low values of t.
4.2 Production stage
In the production stage the U rms take the exible/specialized decisions.
Comparing subgames 1 and 2, and subgames 3 and 4, we obtain the following Lemma.
Dene
~ = intermediate value f;+ (1  ) "  t;+ (1  ) (" Rkk)g:
Lemma 3 (i) Under VS, each Ui chooses to produce a exible input if KS > minf; + "   tg
and chooses to produce a specialized input if KS < minf;+ "   tg; each Uk instead chooses to
produce a exible input if KS > e and chooses to produce a specialized input if KS < e.
(ii) Under VI, the optimal choice is to produce a specialized input if KS < , whereas it is
optimal to produce a exible input if KS > .
Proof. See Appendix (7.3).
4.3 Merger stage
Consider next the merger stage, that is when VI or VS occurs. Given denition (1), we nd the
following result.
Dene
^ = intermediate value f;+ (1  ) "  t; minfL1; L2gg;
 = intermediate value f;+ "  t; minfL1; L2gg:
Lemma 4 (i) Firms Uk and Dk choose VI with a specialized input if KS 2 [ + maxf(1  ) " 
t; (1  ) (" Rkk)g; minfL1; L2g]; in all other cases VS occurs. In case of VS, the production/use
of a exible input occurs if KS > ^ and specialization occurs if KS < ~.
(ii) Firms Ui and Di choose VI with a specialized input if KS 2

+ "  t; minfL1; L2g;
in all other cases VS occurs. In case of VS, the production/use of a exible input occurs if KS > 
and specialization occurs if KS < minf;+ "  tg.
29Note that the relevant threshold of  for the exible input production is lower than the threshold identied for the
specialized input production, i.e. 1  t
"
> 1  t
Rkk
.
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Proof. See Appendix (7.4)
Figure 4: Merger Stage (i rms)
Figure 4 displays the merger stage equilibrium for the i rms as a function of t. The comparison
with the closed economy (Figure 2a) depends on the value of the trade costs. Namely, we identify
the following three ranges of t: low values of t, that is t < "+minL,30 intermediate values of t, that
is t 2 ["+minL;+ "] and high values of t, that is t > + ".
When t is low, VI is not anymore an equilibrium, in particular the area where in the closed
economy we had VI is completely replaced by VS (S). The equilibrium VS (S) takes also part of the
area where in the closed economy we had VS (F). When t is intermediate, the equilibrium VS (F)
takes place for the same parameters ranges as in the closed economy, whereas the equilibrium VI (S)
is in part replaced by VS (S). Finally, when t is high, we get the same equilibria as in the closed
economy. In particular, t > + " is so high to cancel out any gain from opening the market.31
30 In the gures, the term minL corresponds to minfL1; L2g.
31Note that in the open economy, as long as t is low enough, i.e., t < " + minL, the specialization area increases.
This threshold can be seen as the opportunity cost of being exible given by the sum of the tting gain for a exible
input (") and the cost of vertical integration (minL that represents a gain for not integrating).
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Figure 5: Merger Stage (special rms)
Figure 5 displays the merger stage equilibrium for the k rms as a function of t.32 In order to
make a comparison between i and k rms in the open economy (Figure 5 versus Figure 4) consider
the following three ranges of t: low values of t, that is t < (1  ) "+minL, intermediate values of t,
that is t 2 [(1  ) "+minL;+ (1  ) "] and high values of t, that is t > + " (1  ). Firstly,
note that these thresholds for the k rms are less than or equal to the thresholds identied for the i
rms, depending on : as  ! 0, these thresholds equalize. When t is low, we get a correspondence
between the two types of rms in terms of equilibria: this area reduces as  increases, also for any
 > 0, the area VS (S) shrinks. When t is intermediate, for rms k the area VI (S) is in part replaced
by VS (S) with respect to the i rms: as  increases the area VI (S) shrinks and tends to zero for 
high enough. Note that this also happens in the closed economy for the special rms. Finally, when
t is high, the main di¤erence with respect to the i rms is that the area VS (S) does not disappear,
and it increases with . Note that for this area to shrink to zero also for the special rms we need
either  that goes to zero or very high values of (Rkk   "), so that   (1  ) (Rkk   ")! 0.
32Note that, in contrast with the case of the i rms, we cannot compare this gure with Figure 2b where the behaviors
of the special rms depend on . We postpone the comparison of the open versus the closed economy behaviors of the
k rms to the comments of Figure 6.
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4.4 Equilibrium
Solving the VI and VS decisions of k and i rms we obtain the following results according to the
specialization upgrade cost KS .
Proposition 2 (i) Consider the case of (relatively) low values of KS. At equilibrium, VS with a
specialized input occurs for all rms when t < (1  )Rkk if KS < min f;+ (1  ) "  tg and
when t > (1  )Rkk if KS < min f+ (1  ) (" Rkk) ;+ "  tg.
(ii) Consider the case of (relatively) intermediate values of KS. At equilibrium, VI with a spe-
cialized input occurs for all rms if KS 2 [+maxf" t; (1  ) (" Rkk)g; minfL1; L2g]; we ob-
serve instead that if KS 2 [+maxf(1  ) " t; (1  ) (" Rkk)g;+min
 minfL1; L2g; "  t	],
VI with a specialized input occurs for the rms k and VS with a specialized input occurs for the
rms i; if KS 2 [ + maxf(1  ) "   t; minfL1; L2gg;min f;+ "  tg], VS with a exible
input occurs for the rms k and VS with a specialized input occurs for the other rms i; nally, if
KS 2 [ + "  t;+ (1  ) (" Rkk)], VS with a specialized input occurs for the rms k and VI
with a specialized input occurs for the rms i.
(iii) Consider nally the case of (relatively) high values of KS. At equilibrium, VS with a exible
input occurs for all rms if KS > f; minfL1; L2g;+ "  tg.
Proof. See Appendix (7.5).
Figure 6: Open Economy Equilibrium
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The intuition behind these results is as follows. As long as the specialization upgrade cost is
relatively low, as one could expect, specialization takes place for all rms, however, rms decide to
stay vertically separated because the hold-up is very mitigated with respect to the closed economy
(area d of Figure 6). This equilibrium is new with respect to the closed economy.
On the other extreme, whenever the specialization upgrade cost is relatively high, all rms opt
for a exible input and also their vertical structure remains separated. In sum, their production and
merger decisions are not a¤ected by opening the market (area e of Figure 6).
Things become more complex and di¤erences arise among rmsbehaviors for not extreme values
of the specialization upgrade cost. In particular, the equilibrium behaviors depend on t and on . As
far as t is concerned, for relatively large values of t (areas c and f), rmsbehaviors are intuitive: all
rms behave as in the closed economy. In particular, in area c they still vertically integrate because
of the hold-up problem; whereas in area f, the i rms vertically integrate and the k rms remain
vertically separated because the hold-up problem is milder for the k than for the i rms (given that
t is high enough for the relative advantage of the k rms to be restored). In contrast, for relatively
low values of t (areas a and b), the interaction between t and  determine the equilibrium behaviors.
In area a, t is not strong enough for the i rms to imply the switch from specialized to exible input
(i rms behave as in area d); as for the k ones, the e¤ect of t is di¤erent because it is combined with
 and the result is that this e¤ect is strong enough to imply the switch from specialized to exible
input (the k rms behave as in area e). As for area b, the combined e¤ect of t and  is strong enough
for the k rms to imply the switch from vertical separation to vertical integration (the k rms behave
as in area c); as for the i rms, t is not strong enough to imply the switch from vertical separation
to vertical integration (i rms behave as in area d). At rst glance, the behaviors in areas a and b
are counterintuitive, because, given the open economy, one could expect all rms to reach the best
equilibrium (area d) simultaneously, whereas the k rms need, ceteris paribus, lower levels of t with
respect to the i ones. The intuition is that, given that the k rms have a relative advantage with
respect to the i rms in the closed economy, they need a higher gain (lower t) to give up the closed
economy equilibrium. Note that areas a and b increase with  that is a measure of how much the k
rms are special in the closed economy.
Remark 1 In the open economy, as t decreases the special rms become (relatively) less and less
special.
It follows from Proposition 2 that:
Corollary 3 In the open economy, there is never a perfect correspondence between the rmsvertical
structure and the specialization decision (for any value of  2 [0; 1]), i.e., a specialized input can be
produced by both a vertically integrated entity or a vertically separated producer.
If a policy maker can a¤ect either the vertical structure (that is the cost L) or the specialization
decision (that is the cost ), when there is perfect correspondence, the policy maker can act on
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either instrument and be sure about the result. This is what happens in the closed economy. In the
open economy, instead, this does not hold anymore: the policy maker, to reach a given equilibrium
outcome need to act on both instruments.
Let us now analyse better the role of the special rms in our model. In the closed economy, as we
see in Figure 2b, there exists a value of  equal to F 2 (0; 1] that denes a threshold below which
the equilibrium behaviors of the k rms is equal to the equilibrium behaviors of the i rms. In the
open economy, as stated by the following Corollary, this is not true anymore.
Corollary 4 In the open economy, in contrast with the closed economy, the only value of  such
that all rms behave in the same way for any value of the parameters is  = 0.
Proof. It comes from the observation of Figure 6. In areas a, b and f rms k and rms i behave in
di¤erent ways. These areas disappear as soon as  = 0 (and Figure 5 reduces to Figure 4).
Being special is closely related to the concept of open economy. In particular, in the closed
economy the k rms, for certain values of , reach equilibrium behaviors (VS (S)) that the i rms
can reach only in the open economy. In other words, a special rm can be seen as a rm that manages
to get the gain of the open economy in a closed world. In contrast, in an open world, being special
becomes relatively less protable for the presence of the trade cost. This implies that the equilibria
for the k rms are either di¤erent from the equilibria of the i ones or they are the same but occur
with a "delay" in the parameters.
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5 Policies
Once developed the equilibrium analysis, we here address the main question of the model: how can
vertical integration decisions be inuenced by policies at local/regional/national/international level?
So far, we have pointed out the role of the hold-up problem on rms vertical organization
decisions. We here focus on the main elements that in our model a¤ect the degree of hold-up: degree
of specialization, sunk cost (inuenced mainly by the local/regional policy maker) and international
openness (inuenced mainly by the national/international policy maker). In the following we rst
describe the link between specialization and sunk cost, and then we analyse the role of the policy
maker.
As far as the policy objective is concerned, we do not formalize a welfare function as in general
the social ranking of the preferred vertical structure may be ambiguous. More precisely, it is plain
that from a social point of view, the rst best is an industry characterized by vertically separated
rms that produce specialized inputs: this way the society saves the governance costs of vertical
integration without trading o¤ the value of the goods. On the other extreme, the worst outcome is
vertical integration with exible inputs. More generally, the social ranking of the preferred vertical
structure is clear for a given specialization decision, i.e., V S(S)  V I(S) and V S(F )  V I(F ).
Nevertheless, it is ambiguous whether vertical separation and exible input should be preferred to
vertical integration and specialization.
Specialization and sunk cost In the model we have shown that the higher is the probability
that the holdup arises, the higher is the probability that there is a perfect correspondence between
the rm vertical structure and the input specialization decision.
The hold-up problem can inuence the vertical structure and the specialization decision through
two main factors: the number of downstream rms that can use the input produced by an upstream
rm and the sunk cost of this input. The number of these downstream rms is a function of the degree
of specialization () and the level of international openness (t). Formally, we take the probability
of being special, , as an inverse measure of specialization. Namely, whenever  is zero or close to
zero the input is very specialized (in the closed economy the input is perfectly suitable for only one
downstream rm); on the other extreme, whenever  approaches one it means that the features of
this input are such that it can be adapted to two downstream rms. The international openness
implies an increase in the number of downstream rms that can use the input (and so a reduction
of the hold-up problem) for any level of . Namely, when we open the market, for the i rms the
number of downstream rms becomes two, for the k rms this number becomes (potentially) four.
As for the cost, manufacturing a specialized input implies higher sunk costs than manufacturing a
exible input. As a consequence, the risk of hold-up in the rst case is higher than in the second case
(it is nil in case of exible inputs by denition). These costs can be inuenced by the policy makers
decision () through several channels: basic research, specic public IT investments, public research
institutions and postgraduate courses that focuses on a specic specialized inputs, scal policies that
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reduce the costs of specialization, etc. All these policies can reduce the cost of specialization for a
single rm or for a particular cluster and consequently inuence the nal equilibrium.
Summarizing, in our model, the hold-up problem is a decreasing function of  and an increasing
function of  and t.
E¤ective policies Our model shows that the equilibria, in terms of vertical structure and special-
ization decision, depend on the specialization costs (), the integration costs (L) and the trade costs
(t). Manipulating these parameters, it is thus possible, under some circumstances, to a¤ect rms
equilibrium vertical organization. In the following, according to the di¤erent scenarios identied in
the model, we analyse the circumstances in which the policy maker can reach a specic objective.
We dene e¤ective policies all policies that inuence the vertical structure of the rms/clusters by
increasing or decreasing the specialization upgrade costs, the vertical organization costs and/or the
trading cost.
For the sake of description, we here label the relevant parametersthresholds that we have iden-
tied in the equilibrium analysis. We dene and rank the following thresholds for the specializa-
tion upgrade costs according to di¤erent values of : 1 is such that 1KS = , 2 is such that
2KS =  L and 3 is such that 3KS =  (1 )(Rkk "). As for t, we have: t1 = +(1 )",
t2 = (1  )Rkk and t3 = (1  )". Finally we dene 1 = F and 2 = 1  L+ekj .
The policy maker by inuencing the specialization upgrade cost and the trading costs can move
rms/clusters from one equilibrium to another. The realization of these policies is inuenced by the
degree of specialization (). In particular, in the closed economy (very high level of t), the main
policy instrument is represented by . Namely, looking at Figure 7:
i) whenever the inputs are very specialized, i.e.  < 1, the policy maker can achieve a VS equilib-
rium (with exible input) by implementing policies that imply a high specialization upgrade
cost i.e.,  > 2 or can achieve a VI equilibrium (with specialized input) by implementing
policies that imply  < 2.
ii) whenever the inputs are not very specialized, i.e.  > 1, the policy maker cannot inuence the
special rms/clustersvertical structure (VS is the unique equilibrium) but can inuence their
specialization decision a¤ecting the level of .
Note that these policies are always e¤ective when the hold-up problem is maximal (as for the i
rms, characterized by  = 0) or it is su¢ ciently important ( < 1).
As for the open economy, the main policy instruments are represented by  and t. Namely looking
at Figure 8:
iii) in the presence of low trading cost, i.e. t < t2, the policy maker cannot inuence the rms/clusters
vertical structure (VS is the unique equilibrium) but can inuence their input production de-
cision (specialized or exible input). This is true for any level of specialization  and any
specialization upgrade cost .
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iv) in the presence of high trading cost, i.e., t > t2 the policy maker can achieve a VS equilibrium
(with exible input) by implementing policies that imply a  > 2; furthermore the policy
maker can achieve a VI equilibrium (with specialized input) by implementing policies that
imply a  2 [3; 2]. This is true for any degree of specialization . Finally, the policy maker
can achieve a VS equilibrium (with specialized input) by implementing policies that imply a
 < 3 in case of high levels of  and a VI equilibrium (with specialized input) in case of low
levels of .33
The intuition behind these results is as follows. The e¤ectiveness of the glocal policies () is
higher the more is the importance of the hold-up problem. For the k rms, that faces a low risk
of hold-up compared with the i rms, this policy is ine¤ective. The same reasoning holds when we
move from the closed to the open economy.
Since the e¤ects on the k rms versus the i ones are di¤erent, we could think of a measure
of the policy e¤ectiveness looking at the share of rms a¤ected in terms of vertical organization
(NN +
(1 )H
N =
N H
N ). Namely the lower are  and H the higher is the e¤ectiveness of the policies.
Let us analyse the interaction between policies that a¤ect the specialization upgrade cost () and
the policies that a¤ect the trading cost (t). If the specialization upgrade cost is very high, then policies
that inuence the market openness are ine¤ective (i.e. the only equilibrium is the VS (F)). Moreover,
if the trading cost is very low, then policies that a¤ect the specialization upgrade cost are ine¤ective
(i.e. the only equilibrium is VS) but can be calibrated to achieve the Pareto optimal equilibrium
(VS (S) instead of VS (F)) by decreasing the specialization upgrade cost. On the contrary, in the
presence of average specialization upgrade cost and high trading cost, the policies that a¤ect t and
 are complementary. For example, VS (S) can be achieved by decreasing the specialization upgrade
cost, by decreasing the trading cost or by a mix of both instruments. To sum up: since the risk of
hold-up drives the vertical structure decision, when this risk is signicant (i.e. in the presence of high
specialization upgrade cost) or very low (i.e. in the presence of low trading cost) the two policies are
independent of each other: t only inuences the decision to engage in international trade, and  only
inuences the specialization decision. Di¤erently, when the risk of hold up is intermediate, the two
policies are complementary.
European glocal policies There are several studies that analyse the European glocal policies and
di¤erent successful examples that support our modelling strategy.
Recent publications identify possible instruments that regions can use to design e¢ cient policies
and strategies in order to increase the innovation process.34 According to these studies it is crucial
that each region adopt a "strategic approach" by identifying its competitive advantages (i.e. by
33Note that in the open economy the  thresholds change with  for t su¢ ciently high.
34See the OECD (2013) Regions and Innovation, the EU (2012) Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies for
Smart Specialization, and the EC Communication (COM 2010) Regional Policy for smart growth in Europe 2020
All these studies identify several guidelines for European regions.
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Figure 7: E¤ective/ine¤ective policies (closed economy)
a systematic comparison with other regions), so as to avoid a duplication of investments and a
consequently loss of synergy potential between European regions. The European Cluster Observatory,
the European Cluster Excellence initiative and the European Cluster Collaboration Platform can be
a useful support for this initial step. Coherently with these theoretical guidelines, these studies report
di¤erent examples from regions that have successfully used this strategic approach. A rst example
is given by the region of Toulouse which, starting by a smart specialization in aeronautics (Airbus
valley), was able to extend entrepreneurial activities, higher education and research infrastructure to
new areas (i.e. satellites and GPS technologies). Other two important examples are given by policies
implemented in the Flanders and in Berlin. On one side Flanders had recently implemented the plan
"Vlaanderen in Actie" (ViA) with the target to be one of the top ve knowledge-intensive regions in
Europe by 2020 by focusing on value chains, economic clusters, open innovation and grand projects.
On the other side, in the 2001 the Brandenburg region decided to concentrate the innovative policies
in Berlin. To implement these policies, the policy makers identied ve specic elds of excellence
(i.e., biotechnologies and medical technologies and pharmacy, energy technologies, ICT and new
media, optical technologies, and transport system technologies) and four cross sectorial priorities
(i.e., new materials, production and automation technology, cleantech, and security).
Another key element of these glocal policies is to increase the cooperation between public and
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Figure 8: E¤ective/ine¤ective policies (open economy)
private sector. For instance there is the West Midlands Innovation Strategy project (1996), the
Bavarian High Technology cluster policy (1999)35 introduced with the goal to foster innovation and
regional competitiveness of the Bavarian state through the provision of joint research facilities; and,
in Japan, the Industrial Cluster Policy (ICP) based on the idea that cluster projects were more
likely to achieve increased innovative outputs.36
Furthermore, these policies can help rms to acquire components (including knowledge embodied
in these inputs) at a¤ordable price. For example, Falck et al. (2010) found that rms were able
to develop innovations at lower costs thanks to the Bavarian High Technology cluster policy. This
lower cost of innovations can also be generated by a more e¢ cient internationalization. For example,
according to a Finnish survey (Ahvenharju et al 2006), public authorities can help the international-
ization process of technological companies by supplying them with support services in these six areas:
knowledge of international market and technology demand, strategy development for international
R&D activities, identication and selection of partners, identication, selection and acquisition of
35Falck et al. (2010) evaluate econometrically this Bavarian High Technology cluster policy following a two part
strategy. They rst compare the innovation performance of rms in target industries with similar rms in other
German states, before and after the policy was introduced.
36Nishimura and Okamuro (2011) found that "participating in a cluster especially one in which a core national
university is a member, is likely to provide access to increased knowledge ows, facilitate transfer of tacit knowledge
and reduce uncertainty, through better access to local communication and collaboration with other partners".
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technology, skilled personnel, funding for international core, close-to-market and supporting R&D.
These policies are becoming more relevant as the European Research Area is advancing. In
particular, in the European context, the deployment of Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) becomes
a crucial element of any smart specialization strategy. These smart specialization strategies can help
each region to address this gap between innovation and commercial application. An example of the
successful use of KETs is the Slovenian automotive sector which has developed specialised products
to supply the main European car manufacturers (EU, 2012).
We conjecture that many other successes will occur in the next future given these policies, that
actually attenuate the hold-up problem thanks to a risk-sharing e¤ect.
6 Conclusion
We have analysed how the policy maker can inuence rmsvertical integration decisions at di¤erent
levels: by manipulating the input specialization costs (local, regional level), the integration cost
and/or the trading costs (national, international level).
Our contribution is threefold. First, we have introduced di¤erent degrees of specialization. This
specialization heterogeneity is relevant because it a¤ects the signcance of the hold-up problem and
in turn the vertical organization as well as the specialization decisions. Secondly, based on the
increasing empirical evidence, we have introduced the idea that the sunk cost of specialization can
be manipulated by the policy maker through several channels: basic research, specic public IT
investments, public research structures and postgraduate courses that focuses on specic specialized
inputs, scal policies that reduce the costs of specialization, etc. All these policies can reduce the
cost of specialization for a single rm or for a particular cluster and consequently inuence the nal
equilibrium. Thirdly, we have analysed the role of trade liberalization. The international openness
a¤ects rmsvertical integration decisions by mitigating the hold-up problem (i.e. by rising market
thickness).
At equilibrium the vertical structure and the specialization decision depend on the specialization
costs, the integration costs and the trade costs. We have characterized the conditions under which
the policies are e¤ective in achieving a particular vertical organization equilibrium. In the closed
economy the degree of input specialization and the cost of this specialization are crucial in order to
implement policies that inuence the rms/clustersdecisions. This scenario changes in the open
economy, where the presence of highly specialized inputs becomes less and less crucial to ensure the
success of these policies.
As for future research, it would be interesting to test our results from an empirical point of view.
More precisely, we should consider sector level data on: the vertical organization, the importance
of the specialized input with respect to nonspecialized inputs (measured for instance by the relative
amount of resources devoted to the production of specialized vs nonspecilized inputs), the di¤erent
degrees of specialization, for instance how much an input has to be modied to customize an output,37
37We could also consider the Pavitt taxonomy.
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the openness to international trade. Finally regional/national data on policies aiming at a¤ecting
trade openness and specialization costs. The theoretical statements to test regard the e¤ectiveness
of glocal policies on rms vertical structure under di¤erent degrees of trade openness: does the
e¤ectiveness of these policies changes across sectors depending on the importance of for instance EU
trade partners versus extra-EU trade partners?
Note also that our approach allows us to consider a number of further issues. First, as studied,
among others, by Ornelas and Turner (2008) trade liberalization a¤ects vertical multinational inte-
gration, that is the possibility of integration with a foreign rm (foreign direct investment, FDI).
Second, institutions may act either in a symmetric or an asymmetric way in each region, thus a¤ect-
ing in non trivial ways the integration/specialization decisions. Further, this approach emphasizes
a relationship between the previously described regional policies and FDI. This opens the door to
potential strategic policies to attract FDI that, as far as we know, are not deeply studied in the
literature. Indeed, there is a vast literature on trade, FDI, and the organization of rms (see the
recent survey by Helpman (2006)) as well as a literature on regions competition to attract FDI.
The main focus of the latter being scal incentives and infrastructure policy decisions (see Dembour
(2008)).
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7 Appendix
7.1 Glossary
We here report the denitions used throughout the paper.
 KS : specialization upgrade cost
  = Rjj   ejj : (gross) specialization upgrade gain
   L: specialization upgrade gain hold-up free, or net specialization upgrade gain.
 " = ejj   ej j : tting gain for a exible input
 Rkk   0: tting gain for a specialized input; Rkk   Rkk
 Rjj   " = Rjj   0  (ejj   ej j): tting gap.
 + " = Rjj   ejj + (ejj   ej j) = Rjj   ej j : di¤erence between the max hold-up in case of
specialization and the min hold-up in case of exible inputs.
 VI (F): vertical integration with a exible input
 VI (S): vertical integration with a specialized input
 VS (F): vertical separation with a exible input
 VS (S): vertical separation with a specialized input
7.2 Market stage
In this Section we analyse the market stage, that is the price setting in the closed and in the open
economy.
Case VS (F) In order to nd the equilibrium price for the exible input produced by rm Uj , we
rst detail the willingness to pay of the D rms for this input (from which we can infer the maximal
possible price) and then we analyse the selling possibilities of the U rms (from which we can infer
the minimal price that Uj is willing to accept, that is its outside option). The equilibrium price is
determined by Ujs maximal outside option, that coincides with the second best o¤er. We assume
that if rm D j o¤ers the same price as rm Dj , then Uj will sell to Dj .
1) Dj is willing to pay a price such that PjF 2 [0; ejj ]
2) D j is willing to pay a price such that P jF 2 [0; ej j ]
3) Dj is willing to pay a price such that P

jF 2
h
0; ejj   t
i
4) D j is willing to pay a price such that P

 jF 2
h
0; ej j   t
i
5) DN+h is willing to pay a price such that PN+hF 2 [0; ekk + (1  )ek k]
6) DN+h is willing to pay a price such that P

N+hF 2

0;
 
ekk + (1  )ek k
  t
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Uj for j = i can sell to (1, 2) in the closed economy and to (1-4) in the open economy; Uj for
j = k (special rms) can sell to (1, 2, 5) in the closed economy and to (1-6) in the open economy.
 Uj : in the closed economy, the outside option is eij . Then Di will o¤er a price equal to eij
that excludes from the market the other competitors: the equilibrium price is therefore
PiF = eij :
In the open economy, the outside option is maxfeij ; eii   t; eij   tg = maxfeij ; eii   tg. The
equilibrium price is then
P iF =

eij = PiF if t > eii   eij  "
eii   t > PiF if t < " :
 Uk : in the closed economy, the outside option is maxfekj ; ekk+(1 )ekjg = ekk+(1 )ekj .
The equilibrium price is therefore
PkF = ekk + (1  )ekj > PiF :
In the open economy, the outside option ismaxfekj ; ekj t; ekk t; ekk+(1 )ekj ; (ekk + (1  )ekk) 
tg = maxfekk   t; ekk + (1  )ekjg. The equilibrium price is then
P kF =

ekk + (1  )ekj = PkF if t > (1  )"
ekk   t > PiF if t < (1  )"
:
Case VS (S) In order to nd the equilibrium price for the specialized input produced by rm Uj ,
we rst detail the willingness to pay of the D rms for this input and then we analyse the selling
possibilities of the U rms. The equilibrium price is determined by Ujs maximal outside option,
that coincides with the second best o¤er. We assume that if rm D j o¤ers the same price as rm
Dj , then Uj will sell to Dj .
1) Dj is willing to pay a price such that PjS 2 [0; Rjj ]
2) D j is willing to pay a price such that P jS = 0
3) Dj is willing to pay a price such that P

jS 2
h
0; Rjj   t
i
4) D j is willing to pay a price such that P

 jS = 0
5) DN+h is willing to pay a price such that PN+h;S 2 [0; Rkk]
6) DN+h is willing to pay a price such that P

N+h;S 2 [0; Rkk   t]
Uj for j = i can sell to (1) in the closed economy and to (1, 3) in the open economy. Uj for j = k
can sell to (1 and 5) in the closed economy and to (1,3,5,6) in open economy.
 Ui : in the closed economy, the outside option is 0. Then, the equilibrium price is
PiS = 0:
In the open economy, the outside option is Rii   t. The equilibrium price is then
P iS = R

ii   t > PiS :
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 Uk : in the closed economy, the outside option is Rkk. The equilibrium price is therefore
PkS = Rkk > PiS :
In the open economy, the outside option is maxfRkk t; Rkk; Rkk tg = maxfRkk t; Rkkg.
The equilibrium price is then
P kS =

Rkk = PkS if t > (1  )Rkk
Rkk   t < PkS if t < (1  )Rkk
:
Case VI Clearly, whenever rms decide to merge, there is no market price setting because the
input is transferred at its marginal cost.
Summing up in the closed economy market stage, there are the following four sub-games with
associated payo¤s.
1. Vertical separation, exible input: VS (F). The equilibrium bid by Di to rm Ui is PiF =
eij > 0 and so Ui gets a payo¤ equal to eij   KF and Di gets a payo¤ equal to eii   eij .
The equilibrium bid by Dk to rm Uk is PkF = ekk + (1  ) ekj and so Uk gets a payo¤
equal to ekk + (1  ) ekj   KF and Dk gets a payo¤ equal to ekk   ekk   (1  ) ekj =
(1  ) (ekk   ekj). Note that ekk = eii and ekj = eij .
2. Vertical separation, specialized input: VS (S). The equilibrium bid by Di to Ui is PiS = 0 and
so Ui gets  KS and Di gets Rii   0. The equilibrium bid by Dk to Uk is PkS = Rkk and so
Uk gets Rkk  KS and Dk gets Rkk   Rkk. Note that Rkk = Rii and Rkj = Rij .
3. Vertical integration, exible input: VI (F). The merger Uj  Dj gets ejj   L KF , 8j = i; k.
4. Vertical integration, specialized input: VI (S). The merger gets Rjj   L KS , 8j = i; k.
Summing up in the open economy market stage, there are four sub-games.
1. Vertical separation, exible input: VS (F). The equilibrium price received by rm Ui depends
on the level of trade cost t:
P iF =

eij if t > "
eii   t else
so that Ui gets a payo¤ equal to either eij  KF or eii   t KF and Di gets a payo¤ equal to
either eii   eij or t. The equilibrium price for the special rm Uk:
P kF =

ekk + (1  ) ekj if t > " (1  )
ekk   t else
so that Uk gets a payo¤ equal to either ekk + (1  ) ekj  KF or ekk   t KF and Dk gets a
payo¤ equal to either ekk   ekk   (1  ) ekj = (1  ) " or t.
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2. Vertical separation, specialized input: VS (S). The equilibrium price for a i rm is P iS = Rii t,
so that Ui gets Rii   t KS and Di gets t. Whereas the equilibrium price for the special rm
Uk is:
P kS =

Rkk if t > Rkk (1  )
Rkk   t else
so that Uk gets a payo¤ equal to either Rkk KF or Rkk  t KF and Dk gets a payo¤ equal
to either Rkk   Rkk   (1  )Rkj = (1  ) (Rkk  Rkj) or t.
3. Vertical integration, exible input: VI (F). The merger Uj  Dj gets ejj  min

L1; L2
	 KF ,
8j = i; k.
4. Vertical integration, specialized input: VI (S). The merger gets Rjj   min

L1; L2
	   KS ,
8j = i; k.
7.3 Production stage
7.3.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Given the market stage, the proof of Lemma 1 comes from the comparison of the proper payo¤s.
(i) Under VS, Ui obtains: PiF  KF = eij  KF for a exible input and PiS  KS = 0  KS for a
specialized input, therefore eij  KF >  KS , always holds; Uk, instead, obtains: PkF  KF =
ekk + (1  )ekj  KF for a exible input and PkS  KS = Rkk  KS for a specialized input,
therefore the comparison becomes:
ekk + (1  )ekj  KF > Rkk  KS
() KS + ekj >  (Rkk   ekk + ekj)
()  < F .
(ii) The VI entity obtains: eii L KF for a exible input and Rii L KS for a specialized input,
therefore:
eii   L KF > Rii   L KS
() KS > 
7.3.2 Proof of Lemma 3
(i) Comparing the payo¤ from producing a exible (F) or a specialized (S) input under vertical
separation for the i rms, we obtain that VS (F) prevails over VS (S) for rms Ui i¤:
P iF  KF > P iS  KS
() max feij ; eii   tg  KF > Rii   t KS
() KS > Rii   t max feij ; eii   tg :
Therefore, we distinguish the two following cases.
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1. eij > eii t () t > ", then the above inequality becomes: KS > Rii t eij = +" t.
2. eij < eii   t () t < ", then the above inequality becomes: KS > .
Under vertical separation we obtain that VS (F) prevails over VS (S) for rms Uk i¤:
P kF  KF > P kS  KS
() max fekk + (1  )ekj ; ekk   tg  KF > maxfRkk; Rkk   tg  KS
() KS > maxfRkk; Rkk   tg  max fekk + (1  )ekj ; ekk   tg
The production choice of the special rms Uk also depends on t:
1. t > (1  )Rkk: VS (F) is preferred to VS (S) i¤
P kF  KF > P kS  KS
() (ekk + (1  )ekj) KF > (Rkk) KS
() KS > + (1  ) (" Rkk)
2. t 2 ((1  )"; (1  )Rkk): VS (F) is preferred to VS (S) i¤
P kF  KF > P kS  KS
() (ekk + (1  )ekj) KF > (Rkk   t) KS
() KS > + (1  )"  t
3. t < (1  )": VS (F) is preferred to VS (S) i¤
P kF  KF > P kS  KS
() (eii   t) KF > (Rkk   t) KS
() KS > 
(ii) Comparing the payo¤ from producing a exible (F) or a specialized (S) input under vertical
integration, we obtain the following comparison for both i and k rms:
ejj  min

L1; L2
	 KF > Rjj  minL1; L2	 KS
() KS > Rjj   ejj = :
7.4 Merger stage
7.4.1 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) From the production stage we know that, under VS, Uk chooses F rather than S i¤  < F ,
therefore we compare the joint prots of Uk and Dk under VS with the prot of the VI entity.
When  < F ,
PkF  KF + ekk   PkF = ekk  KF >

ekk   L KF if KS > 
Rkk   L KS if KS < 
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If KS > , VI never occurs because
ekk  KF > ekk   L KF
() L > 0, always
If KS < , VS (F) rather than VI (S) occurs i¤:
ekk  KF > Rkk   L KS
()   L < KS
When  > F , we have that KS >  never occurs because this case implies F > 1. Then,
the comparison VS (S) versus VI (S) reduces to:
PkS  KS +Rkk   PkS = Rkk  KS > Rkk   L KS
() L > 0, always.
(ii) From the production stage we know that, under VS, Ui always chooses F therefore we compare
the joint prots of Ui and Di under VS (F) and the prot of the VI entity:
PiF  KF + eii   PiF = eii  KF >

eii   L KF if KS > 
Rii   L KS if KS < 
If KS > , VI never occurs and so VS (F) prevails, because
eii  KF > eii   L KF
() L > 0, always
If KS < , VS (F) rather than VI (S) occurs i¤:
eii  KF > Rii   L KS
() KS >   L
Then, for KS 2 (  L;), VS (F) prevails; for KS <   L, VI (S) prevails.
7.4.2 Proof of Lemma 4
(i) From the production stage we know that, under VS, Uk chooses F rather than S if
Case 1 t > (1  )Rkk [ KS > + (1  ) (" Rkk)
Case 2 t 2 ((1  )"; (1  )Rkk) [ KS > + (1  )"  t
Case 3 t < (1  )" [ KS > ,
and, Uk chooses S rather than F if
Case 4 t > (1  )Rkk [ KS < + (1  ) (" Rkk)
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Case 5 t 2 ((1  )"; (1  )Rkk) [ KS < + (1  )"  t
Case 6 t < (1  )" [ KS < .
Moreover, from the production stage we know that the VI entity Uk and Dk chooses VI (F) if
KS >  and VI (S) if KS < .
When we compare the prot of the VI entity with the joint prots of Uk and Dk under VS,
three di¤erent scenarios arise:
a VI (F) > VS (F) [Case 3]
ekk  min

L1; L2
	 KF > ekk  KF
()  minL1; L2	 > 0 NEVER
b VI (S) > VS (F) [Cases 1,2]
Rkk  min

L1; L2
	 KS > ekk  KF
()  minL1; L2	 > KS
c VI (S) > VS (S) [Cases 4,5,6]
Rkk  min

L1; L2
	 KS > Rkk  KS
()  minL1; L2	 > 0 NEVER
(ii) From the production stage we know that VS (F) prevails over VS (S) for rm Ui if
Case 1 t > " [ KS > + "  t
Case 2 t < " [ KS > .
and, VS (S) prevails over VS (F) if
Case 3 t > " [ KS < + "  t
Case 4 t < " [ KS < .
Moreover, from the production stage we know that the VI entity Ui and Di chooses VI (F) if
KS >  and VI (S) if KS < .
When we compare the prot of the VI entity with the joint prots of Ui and Di under VS,
three di¤erent scenarios arise:
a VI (F) > VS (F) [Cases 1, 2]
eii  min

L1; L2
	 KF > eii  KF
 minL1; L2	 > 0 NEVER
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b VI (S) > VS (F) [t > " [ KS 2 [ + "  t;]]
Rii  min

L1; L2
	 KS > ekk  KF
 minL1; L2	 > KS
c VI (S) > VS (S) [Cases 3, 4]
Rii  min

L1; L2
	 KS > Rii  KS
 minL1; L2	 > 0 NEVER
Note that the special rms choose VI (S) only if  minfL1; L2g > + (1  ) (" Rkk) ()
minfL1; L2g < (1  ) (Rkk   "). Indeed, for larger values ofminfL1; L2g, the interval

maxf+ (1  ) "  t;+ (1  ) (" Rkk)g; minfL1; L2g

is empty. The intuition is that when the organization costs of vertical integration are too large, verti-
cal integration is not protable. Note that the lower is , the wider is this interval. Also the interval
where VI (S) occurs for the i rms is always wider than the corresponding interval for the k rms
(except for the trivial case  = 0).
7.5 Equilibrium
7.5.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and proof of Corollary 2
These proofs follow from the proof of Lemma 2. The following table summarizes these results, that
is our closed economy equilibrium:
At Equilibrium k Firms i Firms
 < F  > F
KS <   L VI (S) VS (S) VI (S)
KS 2 (  L;) VS (F) VS (S) VS (F)
KS >  VS (F) VS (F)
As explained in the text, Figure 2 describes the equilibrium behaviors of rms in the closed
economy. Figure 2b deserves a more detailed explanation. It displays the special rmsbehaviors:
with respect to Figure 2a, we get a further relevant threshold, F (KS), increasing with KS .
Consider the extreme case KS = 0 so that F (0) =
ekj
+ekj
. Dening
"  ekk   ekj
as the tting gain for a exible input and Rkk   0, the tting gain for a specialized input, we can
rearrange + ekj as + ekj = Rkk   " = Rkk   0   (ekk   ekj), that we call the tting gap. Note
that F (0) decreases with the tting gap: the lower is the tting gap, the smaller is the area where
VS (S) occurs. Moreover, as  decreases ( ! L for instance), the area VS (F) becomes larger at
the expense of the area VI (S) and VS (S). In the limit ! 0 then F (0)! 1 and   L becomes
negative, so that all the specialization area collapses to zero. Thus, ceteris paribus, the di¤erence
between the rms Ui and Uk depend on . In particular, this di¤erence is relevant for high enough
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values of  that represents the (gross) upgrade gain: the larger is this gain from specialization, the
higher is the loss incurred in case of hold-up. Indeed, an increase in  implies for both types of
rms an increase of specialization. However, for rms Ui, the higher is  the higher is the incentive
to vertically integrate (i.e., the insurance area against hold up, VI (S), increases). In contrast, an
increase of  has a less trivial e¤ect for the special rms: it certainly implies an increase of the area
VS (S) but a priori it is not clear whether the area VI (S) also increases or rather decreases. Direct
computations show that as  increases, areas VI (S) and VS (S) increase at the expense of VS (F).
7.5.2 Proof of Proposition 2 and proof of Corollary 3
These proofs follow from the proof of Lemma 4. Let us rewrite the cases identied in Lemma 4 as
function of . From the production stage we know that, under VS, Uk chooses F rather than S i¤
KS > intermediatef;+ (1  ) "  t;+ (1  ) (" Rkk)g, that is i¤:
1.  > 1  tRkk [ KS >   (Rkk   ") (1  )
2.  2
h
1  t" ; 1  tRkk
i
[ KS > + ("  t)  " = + (1  ) "  t
3.  < 1  t" [ KS > .
The following table summarizes our results, that is our open economy equilibrium:
At Equilibrium k Firms
 < 1  t"  2
h
1  t" ; 1  tRkk
i
 > 1  tRkk
KS >  VS(F)
KS 2 ( +max f(1  )"  t; (1  ) (" Rkk)g ;) VS(F)
8>><>>:
VI(S)
if KS <  min

L1; L2
	
VS(F)
if KS >  min

L1; L2
	
KS < +max f(1  )"  t; (1  ) (" Rkk)g VS(F) VS(F)
i Firms
t < " t > "
KS >  VS(F) VS(F)
KS 2 ( +min f"  t; 0g ;) @
8>><>>:
VI(S)
if KS <  min

L1; L2
	
VS(F)
if KS >  min

L1; L2
	
KS < +min f"  t; 0g VS(S) VS(S)
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